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‘Home, Religion, Fatherland’: Movements of the 





This article charts the history of fascism in Finland and looks for the causes of 
its failure. Like most of its European contemporaries, Finnish nationalism was radi-
calized in similar processes which produced successful fascist movements else-
where. After the end of the Great War, Finnish nationalists were engaged first in a 
bitter civil war, and then in a number of Freikorps-style attempts to expand the 
borders of the newly-made Finnish state. Like elsewhere, these experiences 
 produced a generation of frustrated and embittered, radicalized nationalists to 
serve as the cadre of Finnish fascist movements. The article concentrates on the 
Lapua movement, in which fascist influences and individuals were in a promi-
nent  position, even though the movement publicly adopted a predominantly 
 conservative anti-communist outlook centred on the values of home, religion and 
fatherland.
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‘Right now Finland is living an ethically strong period,’ wrote the Finnish 
 composer Yrjö Kilpinen to his German publisher Hans Tischer in August 1930: 
‘We shall see how the irreligious, materialistic and aesthetically superficial val-
ues will go up in the air like smoke. The Lapua movement is a vital ethical 
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counter-reaction to materialistic communism, which respects neither the tra-
ditional values nor the Finnish soul.’1
Kilpinen was speaking of the Lapua movement, then at the height of its 
popularity and the only mass movement of radical nationalism to attract wide 
popular support in inter-war Finland. He was also seeing in the movement a 
spiritual rebirth to halt a threatening degeneration of a nation, a reassertion of 
values he thought would be crucial to sustaining both Finland’s independence, 
and to the realization of the further goals of radical Finnish nationalism. The 
movement Kilpinen was referring to had gotten its name from Lapua, a town in 
southern Bothnia in the west of the country. The town became the spiritual 
home to a movement openly admiring Italian Fascism and proclaiming to be 
about protecting ‘home, religion and fatherland’. At the same time, hoped 
Kilpinen and many others, it would bring about a return to traditional, essen-
tially agrarian, conservative values and mystical heroism fit for a nation of 
peasant-warriors.
The Lapua movement is the best known fascist-style organization in Finland, 
and the only one to ever gain true mass support for any period of time. Yet the 
movement remained nebulous. Within its heterogeneous ranks, there never-
theless operated a core group of radical nationalists displaying many of the, by 
now familiar, characteristics of European fascism. This article will therefore 
explore the ideological background of this core of Finnish fascist radicals and 
examine it within the history of the Lapua movement. It will explain the mass 
support for the movement from the – ultimately short-lived – confluence of 
popular anti-communism with the much more ideologically uncompromising 
world of ideas stemming from the agenda of the counter-Enlightenment (or 
Gegenaufklärung), war and unfulfilled nationalist aspirations.
 In the Land of the Freikorps
Finland had been part of the Swedish Empire since the Middle Ages, and as a 
result had participated in the very same processes that in Sweden proper from 
the medieval period onwards came to create the rudiments of centralized gov-
ernment, local administration and the concept of the rule of law. As part of the 
Napoleonic era of conflict in Europe, Finland was in 1809 conquered by Russia 
and incorporated into the Russian Empire as an autonomous grand duchy. 
1 Yrjö Kilpinen to Hans Tischer, Helsinki August 16, 1930, quoted in: ‘Yrjö Kilpisen kirje palasi 
Suomeen [Yrjö Kilpinen’s letter returns to Finland],’ Helsingin Sanomat, March 15, 2011.
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Nevertheless, Finland’s legislation and administrative system were left largely 
intact, which proved to have a decisive effect on Finland’s future development.
Demographically Finland was, and is, a remarkably homogenous country. 
The evangelic-Lutheran church enjoyed a position of almost total hegemony, 
with the Russian Orthodox minority tolerated because of Russian overlordship 
in the country. Representatives of other major creeds, Muslims and Jews, 
established themselves as tiny minorities in Finland only during the nine-
teenth century. While the majority of Finland’s population spoke Finnish, the 
country nevertheless harbored a strong Swedish-speaking minority. The 
Swedish language, formerly the only language of government, was to lose its 
dominant position step by step in a process which in the 1930s occasionally 
erupted even into violence.
Finland’s economic and cultural ties to northern Germany across the com-
mon waterway, the Baltic Sea, had traditionally been close. The area of pres-
ent-day Finland had become part of the Protestant world through the adoption 
of the Lutheran creed by the Swedish crown in the sixteenth century. In the 
late nineteenth century, with the consolidation of Germany into a powerful 
continental power and an intensifying clash of Finnish nationalism with 
Russian imperialism, Imperial Germany rose to a position of a would-be guar-
antor power in case of Finnish independence.
The Russian government reacted to these symptoms of developing separat-
ism with policies designed to tie Finland more closely to the rest of the realm. 
These rather spasmodic efforts of streamlining and uniforming Finnish law 
and administration with the rest of the empire were in Finland widely inter-
preted as attempts to russify the Finns and put an end to Finland’s autono-
mous status. By the time of the beginning of the First World War, Finnish 
separatism had become a reality no more confined to the imagination of the 
Russian gendarmerie. From 1915 onwards, young men of military age began 
to clandestinely leave Finland in order to receive military training in ranks of 
the Imperial German army. The Finnish volunteers were organized into the 
Königliches Preussisches Jägerbataillon 27. The basic motivation of the Germans 
was to the benefit of a movement active within Russia’s borders and capable of 
armed resistance. After the collapse of the Imperial Russian government in 
March 1917, and the subsequent Bolshevik coup d'etat the hour of destiny was 
at hand. German-trained Finnish Jägers began to be infiltrated back to their 
native country to start organizing an anti-Russian uprising, and their vision of 
a new, independent, German-guaranteed Finland.2
2 Max Engman, ‘Legionärer och jägare: Skapandet av en nationell officerskår i mellankrigets-
tidens nya stater [Legionaries and Jägers: Creating National Corps of Officers in Inter-war 
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What the planners in Berlin failed to realize, however, was that the Finns by 
this time were anything but unanimous about the kind of society indepen-
dence would actually lead to. While support for remaining a part of Russia, in 
whatever shape it might emerge from the turmoil of war and revolution, was 
rapidly evaporating among the Finns, the working class had also been organiz-
ing themselves. As a result, a civil war was fought in 1918 between the Reds, the 
forces mobilized by the radical wing of the Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen 
Puolue [sdp; Finnish Social Democratic Party] and backed by the Bolshevik 
government, and the Whites, the forces of the Finnish government, backed by 
Imperial Germany. In the resulting short conflict, termed the War of Liberation 
by the Whites, they triumphed largely due to their superior training and orga-
nization, before Germany also intervened by sending combat troops to Finland 
in the spring of 1918.
The Red leadership escaped to Soviet Russia, and there formed the Finnish 
Communist Party to bring about the armed uprising that had so signally failed 
in 1918. Those Reds still remaining in Finland were subjected to a brutal revenge 
with summary executions and prison-camps ravaged by malnutrition and dis-
ease. Still, the spectre of an armed uprising by the working class, resulting in a 
Bolshevik-dominated Finland, never receded from the minds of the most ideo-
logically driven actors of the White side.
The independence drive had by now created a new political entity. The 
shape of Finland’s future polity was decided in late 1918, causing the new state 
to adopt a republican model of government, to the bitter disappointment of 
conservatives, nationalists favouring a monarchical, or in any case a more 
authoritarian solution. Yet, the conclusion of the civil war in Finland did not 
usher in a period of peace, because the goals the radical nationalists had set for 
themselves went much further than mere independence. With the Russian civil 
war, the collapse of Imperial Germany, and the flaring up of local nationalisms 
in Eastern Europe from the Kola Peninsula all the way to Trieste on the Adriatic, 
the land of collapsed empires became a battleground between local nationalist 
movements, German and other Freikorps, Russian Whites and Bolsheviks.3
A series of Freikorps-style officially unsanctioned and ultimately largely 
fruitless interventions in the Russian civil war by radical Finnish nationalists 
followed. The Jägers were strongly represented in these irredentist attempts to 
New States],’ in Snellmanin ja Mannerheimin välissä: Kirjoituksia sodasta, rauhasta ja isän-
maan historiasta [Between Snellman and Mannerheim: Essays on War, Peace and the History 
of the Fatherland], ed. Jussi Kuusanmäki and Kauko Rumpunen (Helsinki: shs, 2000), 37–38.
3 Vesa Vares, Kuninkaan tekijät: Suomalainen monarkia 1917–1919, Myytti ja todellisuus [The 
Kingmakers: Finnish Monarchy 1917–1919, Myth and Reality] (Porvoo: wsoy, 1998), 56–62.
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push Finland’s borders further in virtually every direction. As one Jäger sum-
marized the tour of duty and the wide sphere of interest of the radical Finnish 
nationalists:
First to the Lockstedt camp [the training camp of the Jägers] and to the 
front against the Russian in Germany, then to Finland’s War of Liberation, 
then to liberate Estonia, then to Eastern Karelia, via Petrograd to 
Ingermanland, and we’ll sleep in Västerbotten [the part of Sweden border-
ing Finland in the north]. There the Lord will let his old warrior to rest.4
The quote, while not necessarily authentic, nevertheless accurately captures 
the wide-ranging aspirations of those wedded to the thought of a Greater 
Finland, including all the neighbouring areas inhabited by linguistic and cul-
tural relatives of the Finns. The most notable gain for the nascent Finnish state 
was the area of Petsamo, a slice of territory between Norway and Soviet Russia 
in the far north, giving Finland access to the Barents Sea. Attempts to support 
the anti-Bolshevik uprisings of Finnic inhabitants in Russian Karelia and 
Ingermanland came to naught, however. Finland’s borders were finally defined 
in the peace agreement of Dorpat (Tartu) between Soviet Russia, Finland and 
Estonia in 1920, a treaty considered by the radicals an abject betrayal of the 
nationalist cause.
Geographically, the new state of Finland was to be isolated from Western 
Europe. With Soviet Russia, Finland had a border of more than one thousand 
kilometres in length, and its sea lanes towards the West ran almost exclusively 
through the Baltic Sea. Finland's only outlet to the ocean, the port of Petsamo 
was connected to the rest of the country through a single road, severely limit-
ing Petsamo’s value as an outlet of trade. Moreover, Finland was situated 
squarely in the European periphery but away from the continental centres of 
power. Geographical isolation bred political isolation, and Finland's status as a 
neighbour to the Soviet Union made her an unappealing partner for most 
mutual security arrangements.
Among the Nordic countries Finland thus stood solidly in two camps. 
Politically and culturally it could claim to be a Western democracy and a part 
of the Nordic community, but the long border with the Soviet Union was a 
feature shared with no other Nordic partner. Finland’s security problem was 
dominated by the Soviet Union, and this very fact also made the most natural 
4 Jussi Niinistö, Suomalaisia vapaustaistelijoita [Finnish Freedom Fighters] (Helsinki: Nimox, 
2003), 59.
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partner to Finland, Sweden, reluctant to enter into any agreements that might 
entangle Sweden in a conflict with Stalin.
It is here that the wellsprings of the mental landscape of the inter-war radical 
nationalism are to be sought. The consciousness of the Finnish bourgeoisie and 
moderate social democrats alike had been seared by the experience of the civil 
war, and the fear of a new uprising of the communists. It is due to the radicalizing 
influence of the traumatic experience of the civil war that even the moderate 
non-socialists were willing to tolerate, and at times support, even the increas-
ingly radicalized expressions of anticommunism. In the process, they came to 
lend support to the radical nationalists, who had styled themselves as the most 
committed guardians of Finland’s independence against the Soviet menace.
 ‘The Revolutionary Right’: The Nationalist Radical Core
Yrjö Kilpinen was a good representative of his group. He was definitely one, in 
the words of the chief of the Finnish security police Esko Riekki, of the ‘patri-
otic circles, who never sit in the government, but nevertheless follow affairs 
closely, for some reason regarding the responsibility of the welfare of the whole 
country to lie on their shoulders.’5
The uncompromisingly anti-communist Kilpinen was during the 1930s and 
40s the second-most famous Finnish composer after Jean Sibelius, and went 
on to be lionized in Hitler’s Germany. Throughout the war years, Kilpinen was 
a well-known ‘friend of Germany’. At the same time, he was a visible member 
of Finnish radical circles, active in Suomen Valtakunnan Liitto [svl; Federation 
of the Finnish Realm], a war-time attempt to gather together all the forces of 
the radical, German-friendly nationalism, including Finnish National Socialist 
splinter groups.6
There were several strands of generational experience coming together to 
form the mindset from which Finnish nationalist radicalism and fascism 
sprung. Nationalism was the indispensable first. All the core activists had been 
nursed with visions of apocalyptic nationalism. The other key component was 
anti-communism. While anti-communism in inter-war Finland was a kind of 
civic religion, of which only the communists and radical left wing of the social 
democrats consciously excluded themselves into the political margin, there 
5 Juha Siltala, Lapuan liike ja kyyditykset 1930 [Lapua Movement and Kidnappings 1930] 
(Helsinki: Otava, 1985), 57.
6 Henrik Ekberg, Führerns trogna följeslagare: Den finländska nazismen 1932–1944 [Führer’s 
Loyal Followers: Finnish Nazism 1932–1944] (Ekenäs: Schildts, 1991), 227–228.
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were deep differences in the anti-communism of various political groups. These 
differences came to be decisive in determining the nature of anti- communist 
action.
A survey of Finnish inter-war politics, undertaken by Kari Immonen in 1987, 
divides the flavors of Finnish anti-communism into four distinct categories. 
Immonen defines as the first category the followers of the social democratic 
mainstream who, despite some ideological sympathies towards the worker’s 
and peasant’s state were conscious of the need to counter the attempts of the 
communists to control the trade unions, and of the growing military threat 
posed by the Soviet Union towards the end of the 1930s. The moderate non-
socialists were close to this group in their pragmatic view, which recognized 
the existence of the Soviet Union as a fact that had to be accommodated. The 
mainstream moderate right was more unforgiving in its mode of thinking, and 
never accommodated itself fully to the inter-war political reality. The Soviet 
Union was seen as a relentless threat to the continued independence and exis-
tence of the Finnish state. The most radical fourth group combined fervent 
patriotism with an express hatred of Russia and Russians, and tended to 
demonize the Soviet Union in every aspect. Their thinking tended to fuse the 
ethnic and political aspects together, whereby both communists and Russians 
were equated and equally despised. Among them it was easy to find examples 
of apocalyptic visions about a coming war with the Soviet Union, which would 
lead to the final destruction of the arch-enemy and confirm Finland’s indepen-
dence into perpetuity.7
Members of this last group also formed the core of the fascist movements in 
Finland. In their ranks, nationalism and anti-communism were combined 
with the ideals of what Isaiah Berlin has termed the counter-Enlightenment, 
manifesting itself as opposition to the French Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution. If the Enlightenment had sought a world transcending the bound-
aries of national states and nationalities, ushering in a world of universal fra-
ternity in equality and liberty, these ‘ideas of 1789’ had found their very first 
critics to be with them from the start.8
7 Kari Immonen, Ryssästä saa puhua…: Neuvostoliitto suomalaisessa julkisuudessa ja kirjat 
julkisuuden muotona 1918–39 [Of the Russian One May Speak…: The Soviet Union in Finnish 
Publicity and Literature as a Form of Publicity] (Helsinki: Otava, 1987), 425–428.
8 Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1997), 243–244; Nils Erik Forsgård, ‘Tattarmossmysteriet: Kring motupplysnin-
gens  idéhistoria i 1930-talets Finland [‘The Tattarmoss Mystery’: In Regard the Counter-
Enlightenment in the History of Ideas of 1930’s Finland],’ Historisk Tidskrift för Finland 
4 (2000): 468–469.
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The author and poet Kyösti Wilkuna was the quintessential representative 
of this mindset. In his 1913 poem Tulkohon sota [Let War Come] he expressed 
the very ideological core of counter-Enlightenment along with virtually all the 
staple ingredients of inter-war radical nationalist rhetoric. Wilkuna vehe-
mently condemned all the ‘musty ideologies’ of the modern world: its ‘limp 
pacifism’, ‘obstreperous fraternity-liberty-equality-ideals’, ‘esperantos and 
women’s-rights-movements’ and the ‘candy-sucking temperance-men’. True to 
his creed, his radicalism culminated in exhortations to violence. Violence in 
Wilkuna’s world of ideas also assumed an easily recognizable redemptive 
nature: ‘Thus: come war and bloody clothes!’ While Wilkuna was a true activist 
of the counter-Enlightenment, it was his destiny never to be part of the later 
fascist movements in Finland. He went on to participate in the Finnish irre-
dentist interventions in the Russian civil war, only to disappoint himself, as an 
ardent monarchist, in the struggle for the polity of Finland. Remaining true to 
his uncompromising nature to the very end, Wilkuna shot himself in 1922.9
Amongst this radical right, there was a readiness to use redemptive violence 
combined with distinct anti-democratism and anti-parliamentarianism, aim-
ing to effect a ‘house-cleaning’ otherwise unattainable through the supposedly 
ineffectual and corrupt republican and parliamentary system. As Paavo 
Susitaival, a career officer with impeccable credentials both as a nationalist 
radical and as a self-avowed fascist, aptly summarized: ‘even though the merit 
for the independence of Finland belonged to the activists and the Jägers, all 
the decision-making and governmental power was transferred to politicians, 
to parties. Already in the beginning of the 1920’s we erred into party squabbles. 
“Democracy” was so fashionable, that even the communist party – a group 
favoring treason and preparing for a rebellion – was considered a legal party.’10
The same attitude combined with a readiness to reckless action is also 
clearly discernible in the vicissitudes of K. M. (Kurt Martti) Wallenius. 
Wallenius’s background showed the common ingredients of a Finnish national-
ist activist: participation in both the Jäger movement and the subsequent 
interventions in the Russian civil war. Wallenius went on to make a meteoric 
career in the armed forces of the young republic, and by thirty-four years of age 
he was the chief of the general staff of the Finnish Army. He was promoted to 
9 Martti Ahti, Salaliiton ääriviivat: Oikeistoradikalismi ja hyökkäävä idänpolitiikka 1918–1919 
[The Contours of a Conspiracy: Right Radicalism and Aggressive Eastern Policy 1918–1919] 
(Espoo, Weilin+Göös, 1987), 260–270.
10 Paavo Susitaival, Aktivisti ei hellitä: Tapahtumia, muistelmia, mielipiteitä 1917–1939 [An 
Activist Won’t Give Up: Events, Reminiscences, Opinions 1917–1939] (Hämeenlinna: 
Karisto 1981), 211.
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the rank of a general in August 1930. Despite his prominent position he allowed 
himself to be publicly associated with the Lapua movement.11
Wallenius was also a good example of a member of the ‘patriotic circles’ 
who considered themselves the only responsible bearers of the cause of 
Finland. They firmly believed to have every right to resort to extralegal action 
if the interest of the country, interpreted by themselves, so dictated. After serv-
ing a prison sentence, Wallenius found a new calling as an accomplished writer 
of travel and nature stories, but never lost his anti-parliamentarian and anti-
democratic world of ideas. His peculiar inversion of the very concept of 
democracy was displayed in his idealization of the militarism and wars of con-
quest of Imperial Japan, which was, according to him: ‘a democratic country, 
much more democratic than Finland, and democratic in a pleasant way, in a 
way based on nationalistic feeling, if not even on national pride.’12
A comparison of Finnish radical nationalist movements readily brings to 
view the similarities with proponents of early fascism in Italy and Germany. 
The fascist core comprised members of the more or less imagined Finnish 
community of Frontkämpfer, disappointed by the outcome of the civil war, 
yearning for a renewed showdown with both the internal enemy, communists, 
and the external enemy, the Soviet Union, and the fulfillment of irredentist 
dreams of Greater Finland. Their hostility towards parliamentarism, democ-
racy and the Republican system stemmed from the same wellspring as their 
ideological brethren in black or brown shirts: a nation divided ethnically or 
politically could not stand. Parliamentary government could only divide, 
whereas the creation of an internally solid and unanimous nation would any-
way render parliamentarism superfluous. A unified nation would need a strong 
leader at its head.13
For the nationalists, the Civil War should have been Finland’s guerra riv-
oluzionaria, leading to the creation of a politically harmonious, unified nation 
and an aggrandized Greater Finland. But it had yielded only a vittoria mutilata, 
a republican, parliamentary government with its political bickering, and the 
dashing of irredentist hopes in the Treaty of Dorpat. The Finnish version of a 
Dolchstosslegende spoke of the betrayal of the White cause by opportunists 
11 Veli-Pekka Lehtola, Presidentin kyyditys: Presidentti Ståhlberg, kenraali Wallenius ja kiihkon 
aika 1930 [Kidnapping the President: President Ståhlberg, General Wallenius and the Era 
of Zeal 1930] (Helsinki: Otava 2010), 64–65.
12 K.M. Wallenius, Japani marssii [Japan on the March] (Helsinki: Otava, 1938), 173–178.
13 MacGregor Knox, To the Threshold of Power, 1922/33: Origins and Dynamics of the Fascist 
and National Socialist Dictatorships, Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 232–233.
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riding the White bandwagon but with only their own interests at heart. In the 
words of the hero of a novel penned in late 1930s by Johan Fabritius, one of the 
most intellectually consistent members of Finnish war-time fascist circles, 
who went on to join the Germans after Finland’s armistice with the Soviet 
Union in 1944: ‘No, we White warriors are not fighting for rewards.’14
 The Heyday: The Lapua Movement
On the evening of 23 November 1929, tension was tangible in the air in Lapua 
(Swedish: Lappo), a small town in Finnish Bothnia. The town lay on a stretch of 
countryside known as the cradle of the Jäger movement, noted for its religios-
ity, where the memory of the civil war as a War of Liberation was deeply vener-
ated. The site had also been chosen by the youth organization of the Finnish 
Communist Party for a show of strength. Youth activists, wearing conspicuous 
red shirts, were on that day to gather to the town to celebrate a soirée laden 
with propaganda and agitation. Having publicized their intention in newspa-
pers, it was hardly a surprise that they were expected. The local house of the 
workers’ union became a scene for a subsequent riot, in which around one 
thousand activists broke up proceedings, ordered the communist youth to 
leave the town and finally started a fistfight in which red shirts were torn from 
many of the participants. The communists were chased away and a public 
meeting was held in the beginning of December, in which calls for ‘informal 
action’, even of an armed march into the capital, were voiced. A wave of similar 
public meetings swept the country, all aimed at pressuring the government 
and the parliament into decisive action against the communists and to safe-
guard the heritage of the civil war White movement. The Lapua movement had 
seen daylight.15
The roots of the Lapua movement were inextricably tied to the experience 
of the civil war. Fear and hatred intertwined, and the post-war frustrations of 
those who viewed themselves as the best and most steadfast core of the vic-
tors, yet having been robbed of the fruits of victory, were instrumental in shap-
ing the mental landscape. It was easy to see in the Lapua movement the theme 
of continuation of the civil war, this time bringing the struggle to the definitive 
conclusion. As P. H. Norrmén, a journalist, banker, activist and one of the 
most  eloquent and refined voices of the political far right later put it: ‘The 
14 Knox, To the Threshold of Power, 174–182, 223; J. Chr. Fabritius, Miehiä jotka eivät unohda 
[Män som inte glömma] [Men, Who Won’t Forget] (Helsinki: Otava, 1938), 137–140.
15 Siltala, Lapuan liike ja kyyditykset, 51–54.
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movement cannot be separated from its deep roots in the soil of 1918 without 
losing its vitality.’16
The Lapua movement became the focus of not just the radical nationalist 
core, but also of the wide sections of society that considered themselves anti-
communist. Nevertheless, the heyday of the movement proved to be very 
short-lived, in practice comprising the year 1930, finally fizzling out in 1932 in 
an ill-considered and ill-executed attempt at an armed putsch. After that, the 
Finnish nationalist radicals were thrown into disarray. Yet the radicals contin-
ued to enjoy influence within the Finnish society, and their final moment of 
glory was yet to come. Instead of dissolving, the radical nationalists continued 
their life under an umbrella of numerous different organizations all nursing 
ultra-nationalistic and vehemently anti-communist agendas, displaying the 
features Robert A. Paxton has forwarded in his attempt at a definition of fas-
cism: ‘a form of political behavior marked by community decline, humiliation, 
or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which 
a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy but 
effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic liberties 
and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints 
goals of internal cleansing and external expansion.’17
It is easy to distinguish these ingredients in P. H. Norrméns characterization 
of the true nature and origins of the Lapua movement:
What in 1918 put the fury into the advance of the White army, as the rebel-
lion was crushed and the Russian troops driven out of the country, was 
neither conservative-constitutional indignation, nor a youthful love of 
freedom. It was the same grim, rustic outrage over the Red infection, 
which again gave force to the famed confrontation with the red-shirted 
communist youth in Lapua town in the autumn of 1929.18
In the case of the Lapua movement and its spiritual brethren and successors, all 
these ingredients were present: a sense of a community endangered and in 
16 Siltala, Lapuan liike ja kyyditykset, 32; Ahti, Salaliiton ääriviivat, 297–298; P. H. Norrmén, 
Politiska essäer (Helsingfors: Söderström & Co., 1941), 99.
17 Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 218.
18 Norrmén, Politiska essäer, 115: ‘Vad som 1918 gav furian åt den vita arméns framryckning, 
då upproret nedslogs och de ryska trupperna drevos ur landet, var varken gammalkonsti-
tutionell indignation eller ungdomlig frihetslängtan. Det var samma tunga och bondska 
ursinne över den röda besmittelsen, som gick igen vid det ryktbara uppträdet med de 
rödskjortade kommunistynglingarna i Lappo kyrkoby hösten 1929.’
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decline, a cult of decisive action and energy, a mass-movement of nationalistic 
militants, a temporary but effective collaboration with the conservative elites, 
leading to a breakaway from democracy and parliamentarianism accompanied 
by an abandonment of the principle of the rule of law, and a project of internal 
cleansing pursued with violence that was nothing if not redemptive in nature. In 
short, the movement was aimed at a national rebirth, sweeping away commu-
nism and finally concluding the struggle of 1918. This would pave the way for an 
ideal state and a strong nation capable of realizing the project of territorial 
aggrandizement. The Lapua movement, considered from the viewpoint of its 
ideologically committed core, was a fascist one. This was not necessarily true with 
the mass of the movement’s one-time supporters, though. The crucial question 
regarding the movement’s future was whether the broad common denominator, 
anti-communism, could be turned into a more specific political program.19
The common enemy of the developing movement, the Finnish Communist 
Party, had been established in Moscow in 1918. Its core was formed by Reds 
who had fled from Finland after the civil war. From the beginning, the Com-
munist Party was banned in Finland, but it operated clandestinely under a 
number of shifting umbrella-organizations. As a front for renewed public 
political activity in Finland, Suomen Sosialistinen Työväenpuolue [Finnish 
Socialist Workers’ Party] was established. It had participated in the parliamen-
tary elections 1922 and won twenty-seven seats in the two-hundred-seat parlia-
ment. After its abolition in 1923 the party reinvented itself as an electoral 
coalition under the name of the Sosialistinen Työväen ja Pienviljelijäin Vaaliliitto 
[Socialist Workers’ and Smallholders’ Electoral Alliance]. The party leadership 
sat in Moscow, and tried to organize party work from there with mixed results. 
Throughout the 1920s the communists were thus in practice taking part in poli-
tics, a fact which caused much consternation and frustration especially among 
the political right. P. H. Norrmén put this feeling into words:
White Finland had by 1919 been swindled of most of what 1918 should 
have won in the way of domestic politics. The system of government, its 
eventual consequences represented by the mocking march of red-shirted 
communists in Lapua, was by no means anything that would have been 
on the minds of the White peasant-army in 1918. Neither was it anything 
the legislators of the constitution had wished – but it was an inevitable 
19 Roger Griffin, ‘Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age: From New Consensus to New Wave?’ 
Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies 1 (2012): 5–7, accessed October 16, 2015, 
doi:10.1163/221162512X623601; Siltala, Lapuan liike ja kyyditykset, 56–57.
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consequence from a decade of limp parliamentary formalism and unre-
strained politicking.20
The Lapua movement aimed to change all that with Vihtori Kosola, who 
became the leader and figurehead of the movement. Hailing himself from 
Lapua, of wealthy peasant origin and with a background in the Jäger move-
ment, Kosola was a typical representative of the core of the White Finland. 
Imprisoned by the Russian authorities for his clandestine activities in 1916, he 
was released after the Russian revolution and participated in the Finnish civil 
war, in the Civic Guards organization and in Yhtymä Vientirauha [Export 
Peace], a strike-breaker organization set up by Finnish industrialists in the 
1920s. With the rise of the Lapua movement, Kosola rose in summer of 1930 to 
a position of unchallenged leadership, parading himself as the ‘Mussolini of 
the North’. Kosola’s home in Lapua served as the headquarters of the move-
ment. Never shy to strike an assertive pose consciously modelled after 
Mussolini’s public antics, ‘Kosolini’ was nevertheless seen by many as an inde-
cisive leader who was merely a follower in a movement claiming to act at his 
command.21
After the abortive uprising in 1932, Kosola’s fall from the public view was 
rapid. He was shortly imprisoned, and while still the elected chairman of the 
successor of the Lapua movement, the political party by the name of 
Isänmaallinen Kansanliike [IKL; Patriotic People’s Movement], he was increas-
ingly sidelined and died of pneumonia in 1936. Erratic, hesitant and prone to 
bouts of drinking at critical moments, Kosola never became the strong man his 
supporters clamoured for. Nevertheless, neither the Lapua movement nor the 
Patriotic People’s Movement ever found another leader who so aptly could sur-
round himself with the same appeal radiated by the real fascist dictators of the 
day. As a contemporary finnish witticism put it: ‘They’ve got Hitler, we’ve got 
Kosola, others have Mussolini, the rest have Stalin.’22
20 Norrmén, Politiska essäer, 116: ‘Det vita Finland hade 1919 bedragits på det mesta av vad 
det 1918 trodde sig inrikespolitiskt ha vunnit. Det styrelsesystem, som i sina yttersta kon-
sekvenser representerades av de hånflinande rödskjortade kommunisternas uppmarsch i 
Lappo, var på intet sätt vad som hade föresvävat den vita bondearmén 1918. Det var för 
övrigt knappast heller vad landets grundlagsstiftare hade tänkt sig – men det var en 
ofrånkomlig konsekvens av ett decenniums slappa riksdagsslentrian och ohejdade 
partikiv.’
21 Oula Silvennoinen, Paperisydän: Gösta Serlachiuksen elämä [Paper Heart: The Life of 
Gösta Serlachius] (Helsinki: Siltala, 2012), 354–366.
22 In Finnish: ‘Heil’ Hitler, meil’ Kosola, muil’ Mussoliin, lopuil’ Stalin.’
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The spring of 1930 saw an uneasy co-existence of the radicals and the parlia-
mentary system, with both parties still superficially respecting each other and 
attempting to work in cooperation. A meeting in Lapua established an organi-
zation called Suomen Lukko [Finland’s Lock] as a country-wide body to coordi-
nate anti-communist activities: spread propaganda, shut the communist 
influence out of workplaces and -sites, and to create an atmosphere conducive 
to legislation which would prevent subversive and treasonous activities of the 
communists. In March 1930, the activists ransacked a communist newspaper’s 
printing facility. The incident divided the movement into those willing to work 
within the boundaries of law, and the activists willing to use illegal means, 
those who would choose ‘patriotic illegality’ over ‘unpatriotic legality’.23
In June 1930 the situation came to a head in Vaasa, where a court process 
against those that had ransacked the printing house took place. Some two 
thousand movement supporters gathered in the town, broke up the court ses-
sion, beating up one of the witnesses for the prosecution, kidnapping the law-
yer for the plaintiff and instigating a riot in which they openly defied the 
police and the provincial governor. The stage was set for the summer during 
which the Lapua movement rose to its supreme moment. The Vaasa riot was 
an open challenge to the government, which failed the test by failing to act 
decisively. The road seemed open and the possibilities incalculable. The pent-
up energy behind the movement was released into political terror, and a wave 
of violence was unleashed against those deemed enemies. The most charac-
teristic form of terror was kidnapping, in which the victim was taken by car a 
symbolic distance towards the east, and the victims’ supposed dream society, 
the Soviet Union.24
A wave of sympathy towards the anti-communist goals of the movement 
swept the country, typically brought out in telegrams sent to the movement's 
headquarters and eagerly published by sympathetic newspapers. A telegram 
sent to the newspaper Aktivisti, signed by ‘A group of men of the spirit of 1918’ 
concentrated many key ingredients of ‘the spirit of Lapua’. In unmistakable 
terms, it expressed both a readiness for violence, and the common understand-
ing of the inextricable relation between anti-communism and ethnic hatred of 
Russians: ‘There are so few bolshies here, and even those are so afraid and 
silent, that we haven’t had an opportunity to “pull their hair”. . . . we are waiting 
23 Siltala, Lapuan liike ja kyyditykset, 63–67; Niinistö, Suomalaisia vapaustaistelijoita, 103: The 
motto of Kosti Paavo Eerolainen: ‘Better to go through illegality to legality, than through 
legality to illegality.’; Silvennoinen, Paperisydän, 365–366.
24 Siltala, Lapuan liike ja kyyditykset, 74–78, 90–94; Uuno Hannula, Me teemme mitä tah-
domme [We Do As We Please] (Helsinki: Helsingin Uusi Kirjapaino, 1933), 17–31, 40–57.
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for a signal from you, wherever our destiny may us lead, to fight together 
against the Russian and the Russians’ henchmen’.25
The heyday of the movement was at hand in July 1930. The main objectives 
were to be forced through by openly pressurizing the government. The 
method chosen was the so-called Peasants’ March, consciously modelled 
after the March on Rome by Italian Fascists. It gathered some twelve thou-
sand marchers from all across Finland into a disciplined show of strength in 
Helsinki, and culminated on a ceremonial parade, received by representatives 
of the government. This signified more than a symbolic approval, because the 
government by this time had already conceded most of the movement’s 
demands, and had submitted a number of new laws and modifications to the 
existing legislation. Before the end of 1930 and after a new round of elections, 
the so-called Communist Laws had been put into effect. Their most important 
consequence was to make the members of certain organizations of the far left 
ineligible for election, thus shutting them out of the political decision-mak-
ing process.26
The key feature explaining the success and influence of the Lapua move-
ment in Finnish politics and society is that large segments of the population 
sympathized with the goals of the movement. The most important of them 
was to curtail the influence of the communists in Finnish political life, a goal 
shared by virtually everyone from the most radical right to mainstream left. 
This made the masses to stand, for a time, alongside the representatives of an 
uncompromisingly radical political outlook firmly anchored in the ideas of 
radical nationalism and counter-Enlightenment.
The Peasants’ March and the passing of the Communist Laws marked the 
greatest victories of the Lapua movement. Almost immediately after the march 
cracks began to appear in the supposedly monolithic facade of a nominally 
dictatorially-led, but in reality multi-polar movement. After the passing of the 
Communist Laws, the question of the next step became acute. What should 
one do with the political left in general, that is to say, the socialists? And how 
should one do it? Would one be allowed to use more extra-parliamentary 
means, and even violence, to attain one’s goals? However, a series of public 
relations blunders began to alienate the general public. Soon after the march 
on Helsinki, in July 1930, the movements’ activists kidnapped the co-speaker of 
the parliament, the social democrat Väinö Hakkila. He was taken by car to 
Lapua to be executed according to a ‘death sentence’ supposedly passed to him 
25 Siltala, Lapuan liike ja kyyditykset, 206.
26 Ibid., 119–134.
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by the movement’s leadership. Though beaten, Hakkila survived his ordeal and 
was finally released and returned home by train.27
More was to come. While violence and threats of violence had been part 
and parcel of the movement’s praxis, the kidnapping of the former president 
of the republic, K. J. Ståhlberg, in October 1930 proved the tipping point. 
Ståhlberg had been elected in 1919 as the first president of the newly created 
republic of Finland. A lawyer by profession, Ståhlberg was a principled repub-
lican, whose politics emphasized his attachment to the rule of law, and who 
sought to reconcile the losing side of the civil war with republican Finland. 
These efforts had earned him the vehement animosity, as well as numerous 
enemies, among the radical circles of the political right. Ståhlberg’s concilia-
tory measures were denounced as appeasement that would bring forth a 
renewed armed uprising of the left. Thus, Ståhlberg was kidnapped, together 
with his wife, driven symbolically some distance toward the east, and then, like 
Hakkila, released to return home by train.28
The return journey of the presidential couple, became a triumphal proces-
sion, however, and the incident caused many to reconsider their support for 
the movement. General K. M. Wallenius was implicated as a main instigator of 
the act, finally precipitating his fall from grace. But even if the radicals of the 
Lapua movement had miscalculated the veneration Stålhberg’s position 
enjoyed among the majority of Finns, the movement still soldiered on. In 
February 1932 it finally rose in open rebellion in Mäntsälä, a country town in 
the south of Finland. At the core of the attempted putsch were the Civic Guards, 
a country-wide paramilitary reservist organization treated as a part of the 
Finnish Armed Forces. The leadership of the Civic Guards tended to consider 
themselves as the bearers of the heritage of the White Army of 1918, and there-
fore formed a hotbed of radical nationalist scheming. The idea behind the 
uprising was for the Civic Guards to rise up and complete what had begun in 
1918, continued in 1930, and was only awaiting a final show of unity of all those 
who thought that no other options existed for the Finnish people than to 
choose between communism and radical anti-communism. By threatening 
military action it would force the government into measures that would ban 
the activities of not just the communists, but the social democrats as well.29
27 Hannula, Me teemme mitä tahdomme, 32–34.
28 Lehtola, Presidentin kyyditys, 9–12, 22–23.
29 Risto Alapuro, ed., Raja railona: Näkökulmia suojeluskuntiin [A Border Like a Crevasse: 
Insights into the Civic Guards] (Porvoo: wsoy, 1998), 209–211, 243–247; Siltala, Lapuan 
liike ja kyyditykset, 197.
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The uprising failed spectacularly. The armed forces and the majority of the 
Civic Guards remained loyal to the government, and surrounded the rebels in 
Mäntsälä. After a tense standoff lasting a few days, during which Kosola and 
the leadership of the movement in Lapua fell to drinking excessively, the 
would-be putschists finally skulked to their homes after a decisive radio address 
by the president of the republic, Pehr Evind Svinhufvud. The narrowness of the 
movement’s base of support was evident for all to see. The allies of 1930 had by 
now largely melted away.30
The movement, however, was not done with. The end result of the uprising 
meant that the path of extra-parliamentary methods had, at least for the time 
being, reached an end. The movement would now enter parliamentary politics 
and organize itself as a regular political party. There was nothing unusual 
about this by inter-war European standards. It was exactly what the nsdap 
had done in Germany after its near-catastrophic defeat in the hands of Munich 
police in 1923. By 1933 the Nazi party was in full control in Germany. The defeat 
in Mäntsälä, or the decision to reform the Lapua movement into the Patriotic 
People’s Movement and enter the parliamentary elections in 1933, did not 
mean the demise of the organized radical nationalism in Finland. Once the 
heyday of the Lapua movement had passed, a new phase of development in its 
history began.
 Swansong: From War to Abolition
The aim of the new party was to ‘build a strong and unitary Finland’, as one 
sympathetic commentator has put it. In practice this meant, as the party pro-
gram unhesitatingly stated, ‘creating a solid White front to secure the achieve-
ments of the War of Liberation [i.e. the Civil War].’ The party program pledged 
‘implacable struggle against not only communism, but against the equally dan-
gerous international socialism [which] instigates class hatred, is alien to the 
patriotic ideals and despises the religious and nationalistic spirit.’31
The program was vague, however. It promised only to get rid of party-
mindedness and politicking by strengthening the executive arm of govern-
ment at the expense of the parliament. Neither was it particularly radical in 
regard to its vision of the political future of Finland; it merely called for a 
30 Alapuro, Raja railona, 209–211.
31 Niinistö, Suomalaisia vapaustaistelijoita, 94; Isänmaallisen kansanliikkeen yleiset ohjel-
maperusteet [The General Program of the Patriotic People’s Movement], 1932, Pohtiva, 
accessed October 16, 2015, http://www.fsd.uta.fi/pohtiva/ohjelmat/IKL/iklyleis1932.
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stronger government and promised to weaken, but not abolish, the parlia-
mentary system, and called for referenda to have a prominent place in the 
political life of the nation. It vowed to fight the social democrats and called 
for the party to be abolished as ‘contrary to our constitutional laws and cor-
ruptive of the fundaments of society inherited from our fathers.’32 On for-
eign affairs, the program was much more uncompromising. It called for the 
creation of a Greater Finland, comprising all the Finnic nationalities, while 
proposing a ‘common bond of blood, destiny and culture’ as the only valid 
basis of citizenship. Among the demands was also a moral program to fight 
‘materialism, selfishness, indifference and inertia’, betraying a thought of a 
community in mortal danger and of the movement as an energetic 
antidote.33
The first parliamentary election in 1933 that the new party contested brought 
it fourteen seats from a total of two hundred. The elections brought forward 
both the extent of the support enjoyed by radical nationalism, as well as its 
primary constituency. The election results meant a catastrophic defeat for the 
main party of the political right, Kansallinen Kokoomus [National Coalition 
Party]. What this party lost, the inheritors of the Lapua movement gained in 
terms of seats in the parliament. Yet later electoral success proved less than 
impressive. The Patriotic People’s Movement  was unable to increase its share 
of the seats in the elections of 1936, and the last pre-war elections in the 
increasingly oppressive atmosphere in July 1939 gave the party only eight seats 
in the parliament. The result showed that the radicals were losing whatever 
appeal they had enjoyed among the Finns.
The war brought on the final blooming of radical nationalist political activ-
ity in Finland. Wartime gave the Patriotic People’s Movement its final moment 
of relevance, and it gained a ministerial position in the government in 1941–
1943. Finland’s alliance with Nazi Germany in the war against the Soviet Union 
seemed to give added political momentum also to other numerous organiza-
tions of the ‘revolutionary right’, Finnish National Socialist groups among 
them. For a time, during 1941–1942, it was possible once more to harbour gran-
diose visions of the future of a White Finland in a German-dominated New 
Europe. Thus, for instance, the discussions in the coffee-room of a police 
department of Kemi, a town in northern Finland, for a time in 1941 concentrated 
on the form of Finland’s future political establishment and on drawing up lists of 
those to be ‘liquidated’. For the Patriotic People’s Movement, the parliamentary 
32 Isänmaallisen kansanliikkeen yleiset ohjelmaperusteet, 1932.
33 Ibid.; Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, 218.
Silvennoinen
fascism 4 (2015) 134-154
<UN>
152
way ultimately failed. The party was abolished following the signing of the 
armistice between Finland and the Soviet Union in September 1944.34
Actual German political support for Finnish radical nationalism failed to 
materialize, as the Nazi leadership preferred to deal with Finland through the 
existing political establishment. It was only in the last phase of the war when 
the last opportunity for action presented itself. In late 1944 Germany began to 
sound out possibilities for resistance in the areas soon to be overrun by the 
Allied forces. The resistance activities were controlled by the ss, resulting in the 
creation of several ss-Jagdverbände to undertake partisan activities, sabotage, 
targeted killings and intelligence-gathering to spearhead popular uprisings in 
the Allied-occupied area. In Finland, it proved to be the very same core group of 
activists who joined these German efforts in this eleventh hour. This was a final 
ideological threshing separating the seed from hay. Those who chose the path 
of continued resistance, turning their weapons against their own country if 
necessary, shared almost uniformly a background in activism and membership 
in the organizations of the most radical nationalists.35
Large segments of Finnish non-socialists had, for a time, joined forces with 
the nationalistic ‘revolutionary right’. After 1932, these same segments had 
been alienated again. What had in the long run undermined the moderates’ 
support for the Lapua movement were precisely the extralegal means of the 
movement, kidnappings, beatings and putschs, reeking of revolution and anar-
chy despite their unquestionable anti-communist motivation. The reason is to 
be sought from the position of legalism and the concept of the rule of law in 
the political tradition of the Finnish political right. It had become wedded to 
legalism during the struggle for independence from late nineteenth century 
onwards, and repeatedly appealed to the law of the land in attempts to resist 
the policies of the Imperial Russian government.
Few of such veterans of the struggle for independence could count better 
credentials among the nationalist radicals than Pehr Evind Svinhufvud, a law-
yer by training, who went on to become president of Finland in 1931–1937. 
Svinhufvud was also a ‘friend of Germany’, who in his public wartime addresses 
consistently called for Finland to stay with Germany to the bitter end. A com-
mentator most certainly not unsympathetic to the goals of the Finnish fascism 
charac terized Svinhufvud as seeing: ‘in the written law, both under and above it, 
34 Oula Silvennoinen, Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft: Die sicherheitspolizeiliche Zusammenarbeit 
zwischen Finnland und Deutschland 1933–1944 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesells-
chaft, 2010), 156–157.
35 Juha Pohjonen and Oula Silvennoinen, Tuntematon Lauri Törni [The Unknown Larry 
Thorne] (Helsinki: Otava, 2013); Ekberg, Führerns trogna följeslagare, 255–256.
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an unconditional justice, and a righteous, moral order of the world. He abided 
by the Finnish law and justice, no matter how imprudent it may have seemed.’ 
It was perhaps ironic that these words were printed, to be distributed in Finland 
in 1944, by the ss, seeking to make a final propaganda effort in Finland.36
The war many had believed and fervently hoped to have been the war to end 
the menace of the Soviet Union and to realize the nationalist visions of a 
Greater Finland, was at an end. From the radicals’ point of view, the end result 
was an unmitigated disaster. As in Italy and Germany, also in Finland the Great 
War had given birth to a Frontkämpfer-community, whose reaction to the out-
break of peace in 1919–1920, had also been to seek to continue the war with 
other means, this time against the internal enemy. At the end of the road, the 
nationalist goal of a strong state and a unified nation, attained through the 
silencing of special interest groups, the eradication of minorities and the sup-
pression of political factionalism, had beckoned.37
The outcome of the Second World War, however, came to mean a transfor-
mative cataclysm for the self-styled ‘revolutionary Right’. The radicals were 
forced to reinvent themselves, most commonly as ‘patriots’, and reorient them-
selves into the post-war reality dominated by the heavy influence of the Soviet 
Union in Finland. There was no more room for acting under the old symbols, 
no room for the old pretensions. The very term ‘fascist’ lost whatever political 
clout it may have enjoyed during the interwar years. Backed with the influence 
of Soviet propagandistic usage, it became a term with nothing but negative 
connotations, indicating an unrepentant hardliner, an unrealistic and irre-
sponsible ‘anti-Soviet element’, who would jeopardize the interests of the 
whole Finnish people for the realization of hateful and aggressive pipe-dreams. 
For the radicals themselves, nothing else was left than to either distance one-
self from politics, or to try to readjust to the new political realities. A refusal to 
speak in veiled terms unavoidably led to political marginalization. Only some-
one who had already become marginalized because of his past, like the former 
quintessential nationalist activist and a former Member of Parliament of the 
Patriotic People’s Movement, Paavo Susitaival, could to the very end remain an 
unrepentant, self-avowed ‘mussolianic fascist’.38
The ‘ethical strength’ Yrjö Kilpinen had praised in 1930, turned out to 
have been a mirage, another betrayal by opportunists who had marched with 
the radicals for a time, but left them again at the critical moment, short of the 
36 Pehr Evind Svinhufvud, Testamentti kansalleni [A Testament to My People] (Stockholm, 
1944), 3–4.
37 Knox, To the Threshold of Power, 176, 261.
38 Niinistö, Suomalaisia vapaustaistelijoita, 98.
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realization of the true goals. Fascism and fascist movements in Finland proved 
failures. The eventual failure of Finnish fascism has ensured the continued 
marginalization of fascism as a research subject in the Finnish academic tradi-
tion. Yet, as Roger Griffin suggests, studies of peripheral and failed fascisms can 
also contribute important insights for understanding both the ‘centre’ of fas-
cism, as well as modern nationalist extremist movements. Fascism as an inter-
national political phenomenon cannot be understood from rigidly national 
interpretative frameworks.39
39 Griffin, ‘Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age, 2, 14–17.
